C.E.D.U. - Strasburgo

CEDU, sez. IV, caso Mockutè c.
Lituania (ric. 66490/09) del 27 febbraio 2018: i giudici di Strasburgo
hanno ritenuto che il ricovero forzato di una persona affetta da
disturbi mentali e il tentativo di 'correggerne' le
convinzioni e pratiche religiose costituiscono violazione
dell'articolo 9 della Cedu. Inoltre, nel rispetto
dell'articolo 8 della Convenzione, i medici e la struttura
ospedaliera non possono divulgare informazioni personali sulla salute
del paziente e dati sensibili inerenti aspetti della sua vita sessuale
e integrità morale.
Nel caso di specie, la Corte ha
rilevato che l'ospedale ha condiviso illegalmente questo tipo di
informazioni e ha violato la libertà di religione della
ricorrente, trattenendola illegalmente e facendole pressione per
'correggere' le sue convinzioni religiose.

Il caso riguarda la decisione assunta
dai medici di interrompere i trattamenti sanitari che mantengono in
vita una minore di 14 anni, ricoverata in stato vegetativo.
Secondo la Corte EDU, il ricorso presentato dai genitori, che si sono
opposti all'interruzione della terapia, è inammissibile.
La Corte ha infatti rilevato come la disciplina legislativa
francese in materia di trattamenti sanitari non sarebbe in contrasto
con le norme della Convenzione europea sui diritti dell'uomo,
nella specie con l'articolo 2 (diritto alla vita).

Il caso in esame vede coinvolta una
società di abbigliamento, multata per aver esposto a Vilnius e
sul suo sito web una serie di annunci pubblicitari giudicati
dall'autorità giudiziaria lituana come offensivi e contrari
alla morale pubblica. I messaggi pubblicitari contestati contenevano
riferimenti a "Gesù" e "Maria".
La
Corte ha rilevato che, nonostante i reclami, gli annunci pubblicitari
non erano gratuitamente offensivi e non incitavano all'odio.
Secondo i giudici di Strasburgo, la multa inflitta per aver
"offeso la morale pubblica" ha dunque violato il diritto
alla libertà d'espressione.

CORTE EDU, CASO RATZENBÖCK AND
SEYDL V AUSTRIA, 26 OTTOBRE 2017 (RICORSO N. 29475/12)

“2. The Court’s assessment

(…)

(b) Compliance with Article 14 of the
Convention read in conjunction with Article 8

(…)

(iii) Application of the general
principles to the present case

38. The applicants
claimed that they had been discriminated against as a different-sex
couple, as they had no possibility of entering into a registered
partnership, an institution they preferred to marriage. The Court
therefore has to examine first whether, for the purpose of Article 14
of the Convention, the applicants were in a comparable situation to
same-sex couples who have access to registered partnerships and, if
so, whether any difference in treatment was justified.
39. The
Court accepts that different-sex couples are in principle in a
relevantly similar or comparable position to same-sex couples as
regards their general need for legal recognition and protection of
their relationship (see paragraph 35 above).
40. The Court
observes that the exclusion of different-sex couples from the
registered partnership has to be examined in the light of the overall
legal framework governing the legal recognition of relationships. The
registered partnership was introduced as an alternative to marriage in
order to make available to same-sex couples, who remain excluded from
marriage, a substantially similar institution for legal recognition
(see paragraph 13 above). Thus, the Registered Partnership Act (see
paragraphs 13-16 above) in fact counterbalances the exclusion of
same-sex couples in terms of access to legal recognition of their
relationships which existed before the Act entered into force in 2010.
In the case of Schalk and Kopf the Court found that the Registered
Partnership Act gave the applicants, a same-sex couple, the
possibility of obtaining a legal status equal or similar to marriage
in many respects. The Court concluded that there was no indication
that the respondent State had exceeded its margin of appreciation in
its choice of rights and obligations conferred by the registered
partnership (see Schalk and Kopf, cited above, § 109). Thus, the
institutions of marriage and the registered partnership are
essentially complementary in Austrian law. In this connection, the
Court observes further that, as has already been pointed out in Schalk
and Kopf, the legal status initially provided for by the Registered
Partnership Act was equal or similar to marriage in many respects, and
there were only slight differences in terms of material consequences
(ibid., § 109). Moreover, the Court observes that the legal
frameworks governing marriage and the registered partnership were
further harmonised after the Court had adopted its judgment in the
case of Schalk and Kopf and also after the applicants had lodged the
present application, and that to date no substantial differences
remain (see paragraph 16 above).
41. The applicants, as a
different-sex couple, have access to marriage. This satisfies –
contrary to same-sex couples before the enactment of the Registered
Partnership Act – their principal need for legal recognition.
They have not argued for a more specific need. Their opposition to
marriage is based on their view that a registered partnership is a
more modern and lighter institution. However, they have not claimed to
have been specifically affected by any difference in law between those
institutions.
42. This being so, the Court considers that the
applicants, being a different-sex couple to which the institution of
marriage is open while being excluded from concluding a registered
partnership, are not in a relevantly similar or comparable situation
to same-sex couples who, under the current legislation, have no right
to marry and need the registered partnership as an alternative means
of providing legal recognition to their relationship. There has
therefore been no violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with
Article 8 of the Convention.”

137. The applicants complained about the refusal to
register their marriages, contracted abroad, and the fact that they
could not marry or have any other legal recognition of their family
union in Italy. They considered that the situation was discriminatory
and based solely on their sexual orientation. They cited Article 8, 12
and 14.”

Il caso: pronuncia di condanna per oltraggio alla Corte a fronte del
rifiuto di togliersi lo zucchetto nell’assolvimento del dovere
di testimoniare in Tribunale. La CEDU riconosce l'illiceità
della decisione.

Non può rientrare nell’ambito tutelato della
libertà di espressione (art. 10 CEDU) la diffusione mediante
Youtube di video inneggianti alla jihad, alla necessità di
affermare la sharia anche con il ricorso alla violenza e alla
sottomissione dei non musulmani, trattandosi di discorsi d’odio;
la tutela rivendicata dal ricorrente, condannato in sede penale per
tali atti, costituisce uno sviamento di tale libertà ai sensi
dell’art. 17 CEDU (abuso del diritto).

(Fonte:
www.federalismi.it)

Non vìola il diritto alla libertà di espressione dei
ricorrenti, esponenti di associazioni musulmane, la condanna per
diffamazione da questi riportata per il fatto di aver leso la
reputazione di un giornalista preposto alla direzione di
un’emittente radiotelevisiva multietnica, rivolgendogli
pubbliche accuse di islamofobia.

(Fonte:
www.federalismi.it)